In this paper, we consider the pricing behavior of near-rational …rms subject to idiosyncratic shocks which can adjust their prices at any time, but may make mistakes. We model error-prone behavior by assuming …rms play a dynamic logit equilibrium. Prices are therefore endogenously sticky: when a …rm's current price is su¢ ciently close to the optimum, it prefers to leave well enough alone, avoiding the risk of accidentally choosing a worse price.
Introduction

1
Economic conditions change continually. A …rm that attempts to maintain an optimal price in response to these changes faces at least two costly managerial challenges. First, it must repeatedly post new prices. Second, for each price update, it must choose what new price to post. The most widely adopted models of nominal rigidity have focused on the …rst issue, assuming that price adjustments can only occur intermittently, either with exogenous frequency (as in Calvo, 1983) or with endogenous frequency (e.g. Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Dotsey et al. 2009 ). Likewise, in recent work, we assumed that a …rm's probability of adjusting its price is a smoothly increasing function of the value of price adjustment (Costain and Nakov 2008A, B). Our setup was motivated by bounded rationality, since it was designed to nest frictionless, fully rational behavior as a special case, and allowed us to estimate …rms'degree of rationality from microdata. However, as in the Calvo model and the menu cost literature, we assumed that adjusting …rms always set the optimal price (optimal taking into account the future costs associated with intermittent adjustment).
In this paper, we instead study the second, complementary, aspect of bounded rationality. We assume …rms are able to adjust their prices costlessly in any period, but we assume they may make mistakes when they adjust. We write the probability of setting any given price as a smoothly increasing function of the discounted present value of setting that price; full rationality is nested as the limiting case in which the …rm sets the optimal price with probability one every period. Concretely, we model the probability distribution over price choices as a logit function. The general equilibrium of our economy is therefore a logit equilibrium Palfrey 1995, 1998) : the probability of each …rm's choice is a logit function which depends on the value of each choice; moreover, the value of each choice is determined, in equilibrium, by the logit choice probabilities of other …rms.
While our model does not directly impose price stickiness, due to the error-prone nature of choice we immediately derive a certain degree of endogenous price stickiness. Since decisions are error-prone, decision-making is risky. In the face of this risk, …rms may refrain, on precautionary grounds, from making new decisions. When a …rm's price is su¢ ciently close to the optimum, it prefers to "leave well enough alone", thus avoiding the risk of making a costly mistake. Thus, a risk of errors implies behavior with an (S,s) band structure, in which adjustment occurs only if the current price is su¢ ciently far from the optimum.
Our framework for modeling bounded rationality, logit equilibrium, has been widely applied in experimental game theory, where it has very successfully explained play in a number of games where Nash equilibrium performs poorly, such as the centipede game and Bertrand competition games (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2002). It has been much less frequently applied in other areas of economics; we are unaware of any application of logit equilibrium inside a dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model. 2 The absence of logit modeling in macroeconomics may be due, in part, to discomfort with the many degrees of 1 For their helpful comments, we thank Jordi Galí, Antonella Tutino, and seminar participants at the Bank of Spain, SNDE 2010, the Zeuthen Workshop on Macroeconomics 2010, and the 11th CeNDEF workshop. Views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Bank of Spain or the Eurosystem. 2 The logit choice function is probably the most standard econometric framework for discrete choice, and has been applied to a huge number of microeconometric contexts. But logit equilibrium, in which each player makes logit decisions, based on payo¤ values which depend on other players' logit decisions, has to the best of our knowledge rarely been applied outside of experimental game theory. freedom opened up by moving away from the benchmark of full rationality. However, since logit equilibrium is just a one-parameter generalization of fully rational choice, it actually imposes much of the discipline of rationality on the model. 3 Another possible reason why macroeconomists have so rarely considered error-prone choice is that errors imply heterogeneity; the computational simplicity of a representative agent model may be lost if agents di¤er because of small, random mistakes. However, when applied to state-dependent pricing, this problem is less relevant, since it has long been argued that it is important to allow for heterogeneity in order to understand the dynamics of "sticky" adjustment models (see for example Spulber 1987, Caballero 1992 , and Golosov and Lucas 2007) . Moreover, we have shown (Costain and Nakov 2008B) how distributional dynamics can be tractably characterized in general equilibrium, without relying on special functional forms or questionable numerical aggregation assumptions. The same numerical method we used in that paper (Reiter 2009 ) can be applied to a logit equilibrium model; in fact, the smoothness of the logit case makes it even easier to compute than the fully rational case. We therefore …nd that logit equilibrium opens the door to tractable models that can be compared quite directly and successfully both to macroeconomic data and microeconomic data.
Recent literature on state-dependent pricing in general equilibrium: Price adjustment hazard exhibits negative duration dependence, "falling over the …rst few months and largely ‡at thereafter": NS08 "Fact 5", KM09 "Fact 10"
Standard deviation of the price adjustment does not vary strongly with time since last adjustment, KM09 "Fact 10"
Summarizing our main …ndings, logit equilibrium …ts micro price adjustment data well, in spite of the fact that we estimate only one free parameter. Our model performs well in terms of several of the stylized facts we just mentioned. It implies that many large and small price changes coexist, in contrast to the implications of a …xed menu cost model. It implies that the probability of price adjustment decreases rapidly over the …rst few months, and then remains essentially ‡at. The empirical …nding of negative duration dependence has been partially attributed to heterogeneity among price setters, but nonetheless it has been a persistent puzzle, even in models that have allowed for substantial heterogeneity. Furthermore, we …nd that the standard deviation of price adjustment is approximately constant, independent of the time since last adjustment. Most alternative models, including the Calvo model, instead imply that price adjustments are increasing.
Finally, we calculate the e¤ects of money supply shocks in our framework. Given the degree of rationality that best …ts microdata, the e¤ect of money shocks on consumption is roughly twice as large as in the Golosov-Lucas (2007) …xed menu cost setup. The e¤ect is much weaker than in the Calvo model because of a selection e¤ect: all the …rms that require the largest price adjustments do in fact adjust. Thus, a model in which price adjustment is slowed down by mistakes …ts microdata much better than a …xed menu cost model, while implying an intermediate level of monetary nonneutrality.
Sticky prices in partial equilibrium
In this section, we describe the partial equilibrium decision of a monopolistically competitive …rm, under the assumption that the …rm makes small mistakes governed by a logit probability function. In Section 3, we incorporate the …rm's problem into an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.
The monopolistic competitor' s decision
Suppose that each …rm i produces output Y it under a constant returns technology, with labor N it as the only input, and faces idiosyncratic productivity shocks A it :
The idiosyncratic shocks A it are given by a time-invariant Markov process, iid across …rms. Thus A it is correlated with A i;t 1 but is uncorrelated with other …rms'shocks. For numerical purposes, we assume A it is drawn from a …nite grid of possible values a a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a #a . 4 Firms are monopolistic competitors, facing the demand curve Y it = # t P it , where # t represents aggregate demand. A …rm's control variable is its price; we assume …rms must ful…ll all demand at the price they set. They hire in competitive labor markets at wage rate W t , so period t pro…ts are
At each point in time, a …rm must decide whether or not to adjust its price. To make this decision, it must compare the value of maintaining its previous price with the value of choosing a new one. Let the value of a …rm that produces with price P it and productivity A it at time t be V t (P it ; A it ). The time subscript on the value function denotes all dependence on aggregate conditions, such as aggregate shocks or deterministic trends. 5 If a …rm chooses to adjust its price, it faces a risk of error in the new price it sets. For numerical purposes, we constrain the choice of the price P it to a …nite discrete grid P P 1 ; P 2 ; :::P #P . The probability of choosing any given price is a smoothly increasing function of the value of choosing that price. This is the key assumption of our model.
In order to treat the probability function as a primitive of the model, we de…ne its argument in units of labor time. While we do not intend to model the computation process explicitly, we assume that the costs of decision-making are related to the labor e¤ort (in particular, managerial labor) associated with obtaining new information and/or attempting to compute an optimal price. Therefore, when we write the values of all possible prices that might be chosen, we divide by the wage rate in order to convert them to time units. Let the probability of choosing price P j 2 P at time t, conditional on productivity A it , be t (P j jA it ). We focus on the logit class of probabilities:
The parameter in the logit function can be interpreted as representing the degree of rationality; in the limit as ! 1 it converges to the policy function under full rationality, in which the optimal price is chosen with probability one. 6 We will use the notation E t to indicate an expectation taken under the logit probability (1). The …rm's expected value, conditional on adjusting to a new price P 0 2 P , is then
The expected value of adjustment is
We assume the …rm adjusts its price if there is an expected gain from adjustment. That is, the probability of adjustment can be written as
We can now state the Bellman equation that governs a …rm's value of producing at any given price P . The Bellman equation in this case is: Bellman equation in partial equilibrium:
where Q t;t+1 is the …rm's stochastic discount factor. Note that the aggregate price level is absent from the above expression; it is subsumed into # t , as we show in Section 3. On the left-hand side and in the current pro…ts term, P refers to a given …rm i's price P it at the time of production. In the expectation on the right, P represents the price e P i;t+1 at the beginning of period t + 1, which is the same as P it ; and subsequently may (with probability ) or may not (with probability 1 ) be adjusted prior to time t + 1 production. We can simplify substantially by noticing that the value on the right-hand side of the equation is just the value of continuing without adjustment, plus the expected gains from adjustment, which we call G:
where
2.2 Relation to alternative sticky price frameworks ... discuss how our setup compares to Sims (2003) and Woodford (2008) ...
General equilibrium
We next embed this partial equilibrium framework into a dynamic New Keynesian general equilibrium model. For comparability, we use the same structure as Golosov and Lucas (2007) . In addition to …rms, there is a representative household and a monetary authority that chooses the money supply.
Households
The household's period utility function is
discounted by factor per period. Consumption C t is a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of di¤erentiated products:
N t is labor supply, and M t =P t is real money balances. The household's period budget constraint is
where R 1 0 P it C it di is total nominal spending on the di¤erentiated goods. B t is nominal bond holdings with interest rate R t 1; T t represents lump sum transfers received from the monetary authority, and t represents dividend payments received from the …rms. In this context, optimal allocation of consumption across the di¤erentiated goods implies C it = (P t =P it ) C t , where P t is the price index P t n R 1
Monetary policy and aggregate consistency
For simplicity, we assume the central bank follows an exogenous stochastic money growth rule:
where t = exp(z t ), and z t is AR(1):
Here 0 z < 1 and z t i:i:d:N (0; 2 z ) is a money growth shock. Thus the money supply trends upward by approximately factor 1 per period on average. Seigniorage revenues are paid to the household as a lump sum transfer, and the government budget is balanced each period. Therefore the government's budget constraint is
Bond market clearing is simply B t = 0. Market clearing for good i implies the following demand and supply relations for …rm i:
Also, total labor supply must equal total labor demand:
Labor market clearing condition (11) also de…nes a weighted measure of price dispersion,
it di, which generalizes the dispersion measure in Yun (2005) to allow for heterogeneous productivity. As in Yun's paper, an increase in t decreases the consumption goods produced per unit of labor, e¤ectively acting like a negative shock to aggregate productivity. 7 Aggregate consistency also requires that the demand curve and the discount factor that appear in the …rm's problem be consistent with the household's problem. That is, regardless of the price-setting mechanism, C t , N t , P t , W t , R t , C it , P it , and M t must obey equations (??) - (11) . In particular, to make the …rm's problem (6) consistent with the goods market clearing conditions (10), the aggregate demand shift factor must be
Also, we assume that the representative household owns the …rms, so the stochastic discount factor in the …rm's problem must be consistent with the household's euler equation. This implies that the appropriate stochastic discount factor is
To write the …rm's problem in general equilibrium, we simply plug (12) and (13) into the …rm's problem (6) . Then the value of producing with price P it and productivity A it is Bellman equation in general equilibrium:
where G t+1 (P; A 0 ) has the form described in equation (7).
State variable
At this point, we have spelled out all equilibrium conditions: household and monetary authority behavior has been described in this section, and the …rms'decision was stated in Section 2. Thus can now identify the aggregate state variable t . Aggregate uncertainty in the model relates only to the money supply M t . But since the growth rate of M t is AR(1) over time, the latest deviation in growth rates, z t , is a state variable too. There is also a continuum of idiosyncratic productivity shocks A it , i 2 [0; 1]. Finally, since …rms cannot instantly adjust their prices, they are state variables too. More precisely, the state includes the joint distribution of prices and productivity shocks at the beginning of the period, prior to adjustment. We will use the notation e P it to refer to …rm i's price at the beginning of period t, prior to adjustment; this may of course di¤er from the price P it at which it produces, because the price may be adjusted before production. Therefore we will distinguish the distribution of production prices and productivity at the time of production, which we write as t (P it ; A it ), from the distribution of beginning-of-period prices and productivity, e t ( e P it ; A it ). Since beginning-ofperiod prices and productivities determine all equilibrium decisions at t, we can de…ne the state at time t as t (M t ; z t ; e t ).
Detrending
So far we have written the value function and all prices in nominal terms, but we can also rewrite the model in real terms. Thus, suppose we de ‡ate all prices by the nominal price level
, de…ning m t M t =P t and w t W t =P t . Given the nominal distribution t (P i ; A i ), let us denote by t (p i ; A i ) the distribution over real production prices p it P it =P t . Rewriting the de…nition of the price index in terms of these de ‡ated prices, we have the following restriction:
Notice however that the beginning-of-period real price is not predetermined: if we de…ne e p it e P it =P t , then e p it is a jump variable, and so is the distribution of real beginning-of-period prices e t (e p i ; A i ). Therefore we cannot de…ne the real state of the economy at the beginning of t in terms of the distribution e t .
To write the model in real terms, the level of the money supply, M t , and the aggregate price level, P t , must be irrelevant for determining real quantities; and we must condition on a real state variable that is predetermined at the beginning of period. Therefore, we de…ne the real state at time t as t (z t ; t 1 ), where t 1 is the distribution of lagged prices and productivities. Note that the distribution t 1 , together with the shocks z t , is su¢ cient to determine all equilibrium quantities at time t: in particular, it will determine the distributions e t (e p i ; A i ) and t (p i ; A i ). Therefore t is a correct time t real state variable.
Thus it should also be possible to de…ne a "real" value function v, meaning the nominal value function, divided by the current price level, depending on real variables only. That is,
De ‡ating in this way, the Bellman equation can be rewritten as follows: Detrended Bellman equation, general equilibrium:
Outline of algorithm
This model represents a considerable computational challenge, because the wage, the aggregate demand factor, the stochastic discount factor, and therefore also the value function all depend on the aggregate state of the economy. In general equilibrium, at any time t, there will be many …rms i facing di¤erent idiosyncratic shocks A it and stuck at di¤erent prices P it . The state of the economy will therefore include the entire distribution of prices and productivities. The reason for the popularity of the Calvo model is that even though …rms have many di¤erent prices, up to a …rst-order approximation only the average price matters for equilibrium. Unfortunately, this property does not hold in general, and in the current context, we need to treat all equilibrium quantities explicitly as functions of the distribution of prices and productivity across the economy. To calculate equilibrium, we therefore need an algorithm that takes account of the distributional dynamics. We attack this problem by implementing Reiter's (2009) solution method for dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks. The …rst step in Reiter's algorithm is to calculate the steady state general equilibrium that obtains in the absence of aggregate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are still active, but are assumed to have converged to their ergodic distribution, so an aggregate steady state means that z = 0, and , , C, R, N , and w are all constant. To solve numerically for this steady state, we will assume that real prices p it and productivities A it always lie on a given two-dimensional grid P a , where p fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::p # p g is a logarithmically-spaced grid of possible values of p it , and a fa 1 ; a 2 ; :::a # a g is a logarithmically-spaced grid of possible values of A it . Given this grid, we can think of the steady state value function as a matrix V of size # p # a comprising the values v jk v(p j ; a k ) associated with the prices and productivities p j ; a k 2 . Likewise, the price distribution can be vied as a # p # a matrix in which the row j, column k element jk represents the fraction of …rms in state (p j ; a k ) at the time of production. After appropriately adjusting our equations for consistency with this discretized representation, we can calculate the steady state general equilibrium by guessing the aggregate price level, then solving the …rm's problem by discrete backwards induction, then updating the aggregate price level, and iterating to convergence.
The second step of Reiter's method constructs a linear approximation to the dynamics of the discretized model, by perturbing it around the steady state on a point-by-point basis. The method recognizes that the large system of nonlinear equations involved in calculating the general equilibrium steady state can also be interpreted as a system of nonlinear …rst-order autonomous di¤erence equations describing the aggregate dynamics. For example, away from steady state, the Bellman equation relates the # p # a matrices V t and V t+1 that represent the value function at times t and t + 1.
Given this representation, we no longer need to think of the Bellman equation as a functional equation that de…nes v(p; a; ) for all possible idiosyncratic and aggregate states p, a, and ; instead, we simply treat it as a system of # p # a expectational di¤erence equations that determine the dynamics of the # p # a variables v jk t . We linearize this large system of di¤erence equations numerically, and then solve for the saddle-path stable solution of our linearized model using the QZ decomposition, following Klein (2000) .
The crucial thing to notice about Reiter's method is that it combines linearity and nonlinearity in a way appropriate for the model at hand. In our model, idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be larger and more economically important for individual …rms' decisions than aggregate shocks. This is true in many macroeconomic contexts (e.g. precautionary saving) and in particular Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) , Golosov and Lucas (2007) , and Midrigan (2008) argue that …rms' pricing decisions appear to be driven primarily by idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, to deal with large idiosyncratic shocks, we treat functions of idiosyncratic states in a fully nonlinear way, by calculating them on a grid. As we emphasized above, this grid-based solution can be regarded as a large system of nonlinear equations, with equations speci…c to each of the grid points. By linearizing each of these equations with respect to the aggregate dynamics, we recognize that aggregate changes are unlikely to a¤ect individual value functions in a strongly nonlinear way. That is, we are implicitly assuming that both the aggregate shocks z t , and changes in the distribution t , have su¢ ciently smooth impact on individual values that a linear treatment of these e¤ects su¢ ces. On the other hand, we need not start from any assumption of approximate aggregation like that required for the Krusell and Smith (1998) method, nor do we need to impose any particular functional form on the distribution .
Describing the distributional dynamics involves de…ning many matrices related to quantities de…ned on the grid . From here on, we use bold face to identify matrices, and superscripts to identify notation related to grids. Matrices associated with grid are all de…ned so that row j relates to price p j 2 p , and column k relates to productivity a k 2 a . As we mentioned already, the value function is described by matrix V t with elements v jk t v t (p j ; a k ) v(p j ; a k ; t ). We also de…ne matrices D t , t , and G t , with elements d (p j ; a k ) . The distribution at the time of production is given by t with elements jk t representing the fraction of …rms with real price p it P it =P t = p j and productivity A it = a k at the time of production. We also de…ne the beginning of period distribution e t with elements e jk t representing the fraction of …rms with real price e p it e P it =P t = p j and productivity A it = a k at the beginning of the period. Shortly we will de…ne the transition matrices that govern the relationships between all these objects.
The discretized model
Finally, we also de…ne a matrix of logit probabilities t , which has its (j; k) element given by
which is the probability of choosing real price p j conditional on productivity a k if the …rm decides to adjust its price at time t.
We can now write the discrete Bellman equation and the discrete distributional dynamics in a precise way. First, consider how the beginning-of-period distribution e t is derived from the lagged distribution t 1 . Idiosyncratic productivities A i are driven by an exogenous Markov process, which can be de…ned in terms of a matrix S of size # a # a . The row m, column k element of S represents the probability
Also, beginning-of-period real prices are, by de…nition, adjusted for in ‡ation. Ignoring grids, the time t 1 real price p i;t 1 would de ‡ated to e p it p i;t 1 = t p i;t 1 P t 1 =P t at the beginning of t. To keep prices on the grid, we de…ne a # p # p Markov matrix R t in which the row m, column l element is R ml t
prob(e p it = p m jp i;t 1 = p l )
When the de ‡ated price p i;t 1 = t falls between two grid points, matrix R t must round up or down stochastically. Also, if p i;t 1 = t lies outside the smallest and largest element of the grid, then R t must round up or down to keep prices on the grid. 8 Therefore we construct R t according 8 In other words, we assume that any nominal price that would have a real value less than p 1 after in ‡ation is automatically adjusted upwards so that its real value is p 1 . This assumption is made for numerical purposes only, and has a negligible impact on the equilibrium as long as we choose a su¢ ciently wide grid p . If we were to compute examples with trend de ‡ation, we would need to make an analogous adjustment to prevent real prices from exceding the maximum grid point p
Combining the adjustments of prices and productivities, we can calculate the beginning-ofperiod distribution e t as a function of the lagged distribution of production prices t 1 :
where represents ordinary matrix multiplication. The simplicity of this equation comes partly from the fact that the exogenous shocks to A it are independent of the in ‡ation adjustment that links e p it with p it 1 . Also, exogenous shocks are represented from left to right in the matrix t , so that their transitions can be treated by right multiplication, while policies are represented vertically, so that transitions related to policies can be treated by left multiplication.
Next, consider how the time t production distribution t is derived from the beginning-ofperiod distribution e t . Suppose a …rm has beginning-of-t price e p it e P it =P t = p j 2 p and productivity A it = a k 2 a . This …rm will adjust its production price with probability jk t , or will leave it unchanged (p it = e p it = p j ) with probability 1 jk t . If adjustment occurs, the probabilities of choosing all possible prices are given by the matrix t . Therefore we can calculate distribution t from e t as follows:
where (as in MATLAB) the operator : represents element-by-element multiplication, and represents ordinary matrix multiplication. The same transition matrices R and S show up when we write the Bellman equation in matrix form. Let U t be the # p # a matrix of current payo¤s, with elements
for p j ; a k 2 . Then the Bellman equation is Dynamic general equilibrium Bellman equation, matrix version:
The expectation E t in the Bellman equation refers only to the e¤ects of the time t + 1 aggregate shock z t+1 , because the shocks and dynamics of the idiosyncratic state (p j ; a k ) 2 are completely described by the matrices R 0 t+1 and S. Note that since the Bellman equation iterates backwards in time, its transitions are represented by R 0 and S, whereas the distributional dynamics iterate forward in time and therefore contain R and S 0 .
While equilibrium seems to involve a very complex system of equations, the steady state is easy to solve because it reduces to a small scalar …xed-point problem, which is the …rst step of Reiter's (2009) method. This …rst step is discussed in the next subsection. The second step of the method, in which we linearize all equilibrium equations, is discussed in subsection 3.4.
Step 1: steady state
In the aggregate steady state, the shocks are zero, and the distribution takes some unchanging value , so the state of the economy is constant: t (z t ; t 1 ) = (0; ) . We indicate the steady state of all equilibrium objects by dropping the time subscript t, so the steady state value function V has elements v jk v(p j ; a k ; ) v(p j ; a k ).
Long run monetary neutrality in steady state implies that the rate of nominal money growth equals the rate of in ‡ation: =
Morever, the Euler equation reduces to = R
Since the interest rate and in ‡ation rate are observable, together they determine the required parameterization of . The steady-state transition matrix R is known, since it depends only on steady state in ‡ation . We can then calculate general equilibrium as a one-dimensional root-…nding problem: guessing the wage w, we have enough information to solve the Bellman equation and the distributional dynamics. 9 Knowing the steady state aggregate distribution, we can construct the real price level, which must be one. Thus …nding a value of w at which the real price level is one amounts to …nding a steady state general equilibrium.
More precisely, for any w, we can calculate
and then construct the matrix U with elements
We then …nd the …xed point of the value function:
together with the logit probability function , with elements
We can then …nd the steady state distribution as the …xed point of
Finally, we check whether
If so, an equilibrium value of w has been found. 9 There are other, equivalent ways of describing the root-…nding problem: for example, we could begin by guessing C. Guessing w is convenient since we know that in a representative-agent, ‡exible-price model, we have w =
1 . This suggests a good starting value for the heterogeneous-agent, sticky-price calculation.
Step 2: linearized dynamics
Given the steady state, the general equilibrium dynamics can be calculated by linearization.
To do so, we eliminate as many variables from the equation system as we can. For additional simplicity, we assume linear labor disutility, x(N ) = N . Thus the …rst-order condition for labor reduces to = w t u 0 (C t ), so we don't actually need to solve for N t in order to calculate the rest of the equilibrium. 10 We can then summarize the general equilibrium equation system in terms of the exogenous shock process z t , the lagged distribution of idiosyncratic states t 1 , which is the endogenous component of the time t aggregate state; and …nally the endogenous 'jump'variables including V t , t , C t , R t , and t . The equation systems reduces to
If we now collapse all the endogenous variables into a single vector
then the whole set of expectational di¤erence equations (29)- (33) governing the dynamic equilibrium becomes a …rst-order system of the following form:
where E t is an expectation conditional on z t and all previous shocks. To see that the variables in vector ! X t are in fact the only variables we need, note that given t and t+1 we can construct R t and R t+1 . Given R t , we can construct e t = R t t 1 S 0 from t 1 . Under linear labor disutility, we can calculate w t = =u 0 (C t ), which gives us all the information needed to construct U t , with (j; k) element equal to u
Finally, given V t and V t+1 we can construct t , D t , and D t+1 , and thus t and G t+1 . Therefore the variables in ! X t and z t are indeed su¢ cient to evaluate the system (29)- (33) . Finally, if we linearize system F numerically with respect to all its arguments to construct the Jacobian matrices A D ! X t+1 F, B D ! X t F, C D z t+1 F, and D D zt F, then we obtain the following …rst-order linear expectational di¤erence equation system:
where represents a deviation from steady state. This system has the form considered by Klein (2000), so we solve our model using his QZ decomposition method. 11 
Results
Parameterization
We calibrate our model to match the monthly frequency of price changes in US CPI data. We set the steady state growth rate of money to 0%: This is consistent with the zero average price change in the AC Nielsen data of household product purchases (Midrigan, 2008 ), which we use to test our model's ability to generate a realistic size distribution of price changes. The model is one of "regular" price changes, exlcuding temporary "sales". As in Costain and Nakov (2008A, B) , we take most of our parameterization directly from Golosov and Lucas (2007). Thus we set the discount factor to = 1:04 1=12 . Consumption utility is CRRA, u(C) = We assume productivity is AR(1) in logs: log A it = log A it 1 + " a t ; where " a t is a mean-zero, normal, iid shock. We take the autocorrelation parameter from Blundell and Bond (2000) who estimate it from a panel of 509 US manufacturing companies over 8 years, 1982-1989 . Their preferred estimate is 0.565 on an annual basis, which implies around 0:95 in monthly frequency.
The variance of log productivity is 2 a = (1 2 ) 2 " , where 2 " is the variance of the innovation " a t . We set the standard deviation of log productivity to a = 0:06, which is the standard deviation of "reference costs" estimated by Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2008). Given our grid-based approximation, this implies a maximum absolute log price change of 0:48; which covers, with an extra margin of 7%, the maximum absolute log price change of 0.45 observed in the AC Nielsen dataset.
This leaves us with a single parameter to estimate: the logit rationality parameter . We choose to match the 10% median monthly frequency of price changes estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) . The rationality parameter strongly a¤ects the frequency of price changes. Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize our main estimation results. Our estimated rationality parameter is = 23:4, implying a relatively small deviation from fully rational behavior (i.e. the coe¢ cient of 23.4 inside the exponential function that determines the probabilities of di¤erent actions implies low probabilities of large errors). Table 1 reports the losses implied by the errors in our model: we report the mean loss su¤ered relative to a fully rational …rm, as a percentage of average revenues of a fully rational …rm. In the baseline estimate, …rms lose half a percent of revenues due to imperfect rationality. The distribution of losses can also be seen in the last panel of Figure 1 , which shows the distribution both before and after …rms decide whether or not to adjust.
Steady state results
The …rst column of Table 1 also shows the main statistics of price adjustment implied by our estimates. With a single free parameter, we hit our single calibration target, the 10% monthly frequency of price changes estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) (the last three columns of the table show data from several sources). The remaining moments also appear quite consistent with the distribution of price adjustments in the data, which is illustrated in the …rst panel of Figure 1 . The histogram of price changes shows 51 equally-spaced bins representing log price changes from -0.5 to 0.5. The blue shaded bars in the …gure represent the AC Nielsen data, and the black line represents the results of our estimated model. The standard deviation of price adjustments is matched relatively well: 14.5% in our model versus 13.2% in the data. As in the data, half of the price adjustments in our model are price increases. Kurtosis is somewhat lower in our model (2.6) than in the data (3.5), as can be seen from the relatively fat tails in the blue shaded data in the …gure.
Notably, we are able to reproduce one of the puzzling observations in the context of the …xed menu cost model, namely, the coexistence of large and small price changes. Even though typical price adjustments are large, well over 10%, around 20% of all adjustments in our model are less than 5% in absolute value, compared with 25% in the data. In contrast, both the Calvo and the …xed menu cost model imply too many small price changes. Like the menu cost model, our framework also exhibits (S,s) behavior, as illustrated by the seventh and eight panels of Figure 1 ; inside the (S,s) bands …rms choose not to adjust because the expected value of adjustment is not high enough to justify the risk of an error. Nonetheless, since the actual size of price adjustment is determined stochastically, a wide range of price adjustments is observed, including a number of "small" price changes.
Another striking …nding relates to the behavior of price changes as a function of the time since last adjustment. The second panel of Figure 1 shows the adjustment hazard, that is, the probability of a price change as a function of the time since last adjustment. Error-prone decisions mean that …rms sometimes readjust quickly after making a change, when their decision turns out to have been a mistake. This accounts for the spike in the adjustment hazard at one month. The adjustment hazard remains more mildly decreasing over the next few months, driven by small errors subsequently compounded by unfavorable shocks; it is thereafter largely ‡at. This pattern is quite consistent with microdata; it fails by construction in the Calvo model and also contrasts with the increasing hazard typically generated by menu cost models. Many studies have suggested that decreasing hazards in the data may be caused by heterogeneity in adjustment frequencies. While this seems to be a reasonable explanation for part of the e¤ect observed in the data, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), among others, …nd decreasing hazards even after controlling for heterogeneity.
Finally, the third panel of Figure 1 shows the size of price changes as a function of the time since last adjustment. In the Calvo model, and menu cost models, this is typically an increasing function. In the data, it is largely ‡at, like we …nd in our model.
E¤ects of a money growth shock
Figures 2-3 and Table 2 illustrate the macroeconomic implications of our estimated model. The …gures show impulse responses of in ‡ation, consumption, and other variables to money supply shocks z t , with an AR(1) persistence parameter of z = 0:8 (monthly, implying quarterly persistence of 0.5). Under our baseline PPS calibration, we …nd a degree of monetary nonneutrality smaller than the Calvo but larger than the …xed menu cost model. As we see in Figure 2 , the impulse responses from the PPS speci…cation lie in between the Calvo and the menu cost models; in particular, the consumption response under PPS is slightly stronger and more persistent on impact than the menu cost speci…cation, but much weaker and more transitory than Calvo.
Focusing on the baseline responses (red lines with dots), the reason for the weaker response of consumption than Calvo is that a money growth shock causes a stronger spike in in ‡ation. As Golosov and Lucas emphasized for the menu cost case, the in ‡ation spike is driven by a selection e¤ect: the in ‡ation response is relatively large because the …rms that adjust are the ones whose prices deviate most with respect current conditions. In the PPS setup …rms'price setting decisions are subject to error, making the aggregate in ‡ation e¤ect slightly smaller than that for menu costs.
Likewise, in Table 2 we report a baseline estimate of the slope of the "Phillips curve" (the contemporaneous e¤ect of in ‡ation on output) of 0.27. This is almost double the coe¢ cient under menu costs (0.15), but is still quite small, less than a third of the coe¢ cient under Calvo pricing (1.1). Thus, considering our steady-state and dynamic results together, we conclude that matching price microdata does not necessarily require a model with as large a degree of aggregate stickiness as that of the Calvo model. Allowing for small mistakes in the size of price changes is very helpful for reproducing the distribution of price changes, but generates relatively trivial real e¤ects of nominal shocks. Tables 1-2 and Figure 3 also show also how the behavior of the PPS model varies with the parameter that controls the degree of rationality. In Table 1 , doubling the degree of rationality causes the frequency of price adjustment to rise from 10% to 12.3% per month, and the average price change becomes smaller. This makes sense-with greater rationality, price adjustment is less risky, so …rms become willing to adjust even when their prices are not so far out of line.
Changing the degree of rationality
Likewise, in Figure 3 , doubling the degree of rationality increases the initial spike in in ‡ation, so that the real e¤ect of the nominal shock is smaller than in the baseline calibration. In other words, as rationality increases the PPS model eventually converges to a fully ‡exible setup in which money is entirely neutral.
Nested logit
The preceding simulations have explored the empirical implications of error-prone decisionmaking, and the precautionary behavior it implies, in an otherwise simple and standard DSGE framework. However, as an analysis of near-rational pricing behavior, the setup explored so far exhibits an inelegant asymmetry. Standard models of price stickiness assume frictions a¤ect the timing of price adjustment, but assume that whenever adjustment occurs, the size of the price change is exactly optimal. Our paper has explored the opposite extreme: the timing of price adjustment is assumed optimal, but mistakes occur in choosing the size of the change.
Realism, though, suggests that we should consider mistakes on both margins; a decision maker who does not know exactly what price to set is also unlikely to know exactly when adjustment is necessary. Similarly, it is clear that our previous formulation has imposed a strong and arbitrary parameter restriction. We have allowed a degree of freedom in the accuracy of decision-making, and we have estimated the parameter governing this accuracy. But we assumed, without o¤ering any justi…cation, that decisions can occur once per period (meaning once per month, since this is the frequency at which we simulate our model). To avoid imposing arbitrary restrictions on our parameterization, we should instead allow a degree of freedom in the speed of decision-making, as well as its accuracy.
An obvious way of extending our model to allow for mistakes both in size and in timing is to nest the logit price changes considered so far inside a logit model of the decision whether or not to adjust. Following our previous notation, a …rm that does not adjust when its current state is (P; A) obtains the value V (P; A). A …rm that adjusts obtains expected value E V (P 0 ; A), where the new price P 0 is governed by the logit price distribution (1) . If the …rm decides at time t whether or not to adjust its price, and we model this decision as a logit choice with noise parameter , then the probability of adjustment at t is
This function has the desirable property (0) = 0:5, meaning that when the …rm chooses whether or not to adjust, and considers each option equally valuable, it takes each choice with probability one half.
It might seem natural to use this function (x) in the place of our previous function (x). Unfortunately, this does not provide us with a free parameter related to the speed of decisionmaking. Even if we were to use a di¤erent noise parameter in the de…nition of the function (x) from the one used in the de…nition of (P jA), the property that (0) = 0:5 would still hold. That is, regardless of the value of , setting (x) = (x) would implicitly assume exactly one decision per period. Therefore varying fails to provide a degree of freedom in the length of the data period relative to the theoretical period over which decisions are taken.
Therefore, to allow a degree of freedom in the speed of decision-making, we assume there exists an underlying rate of decisions per period, . We treat as a Poisson arrival rate, so that over any brief interval dt, the …rm gets to make a decision with probability dt. When a decision opportunity arrives, the …rm chooses whether or not to adjust its price according to the logit rule (36) . The probability of price adjustment over brief interval dt is therefore Dt(P;A it ) Wt dt, and over one model period it becomes
In the discretized version of the model, this requires
In this speci…cation, represents the speed at which decisions of accuracy can be made. It resembles a Calvo parameter, but nonetheless implies that the observed probability of price adjustment is state-dependent, since actual adjustments are more likely to occur when they are more valuable. When the …rm actually adjusts its price, the distribution of adjustments is given by (1) . As before, the fact that we regard errors as being related to the time cost of reasoning motivates us to express the argument of the function in time units (by dividing by the wage), and to impose the same degree of noise in the two logit functions (1) and (36).
Nested logit results
The dynamics of the nested logit speci…cation can be calculated by precisely the same method we have already discussed. Relative to our previous speci…cation, equation (37) replaces (4), where (x) is de…ned by (36) , and (38) replaces (17) , leaving the remaining equations unchanged.
To parameterize this speci…cation, we must estimate both and . As before, we parameterize to reproduce steady-state price adjustment behavior. First, we target the frequency of price adjustment (a 10% median monthly frequency, according to the data of Nakamura and Steinsson). Second, we also target the size of price adjustment (a mean absolute log price change of 10.4%, in Midrigan's AC Nielsen data). Setting = 7:65 and = 0:232 matches both these statistics.
The results are shown in the "Nested logit" columns of Tables 1 and 2 , and also in Figures  4 and 5 . The main statistics of the steady-state price distribution are similar to those we found before, and …t the data well. Nonetheless, several aspects of the model's behavior are substantially changed. In particular, …rms su¤er larger losses and money shocks have larger real e¤ects in the nested logit setup as compared with the baseline model. Another key change is that the adjustment hazard becomes nearly ‡at, as a function of time since last adjustment, in the nested logit case.
All of these changes in the model's behavior can be understood on the basis of one key mechanism. Unlike our baseline speci…cation, under the nested logit model the noise parameter causes mistakes both in the size and in the timing of price adjustments. Comparing Figures 1  and 4 , the baseline and nested logit models impose fairly similar price distributions conditional on productivity. But the function governing the probability of adjustment behaves very di¤erently in the two cases, jumping from 0 to 1 (along a pair of "S,s bands") in the baseline model, but varying smoothly between 0.05 and 0.2 in the nested logit case. This di¤erence is also seen in the density of adjusting …rms, which is concentrated along the "S,s bands" in the baseline model, and is instead very di¤use for the nested logit.
By strongly smoothing out the probabilities of adjustment in this way, the nested logit speci…cation greatly diminishes "selection e¤ects". As Golosov and Lucas emphasized, eliminating selection e¤ects increases the real e¤ects of money shocks, as we can see in the Phillips curve slopes in Table 2 and the impulse response functions in Figure 5 , where the nested logit model resembles the Calvo case. The smooth, unimodal distribution of price changes in the nested logit model also resembles that in the Calvo model (comparing the …rst panels in Figures 1 and  4) , and contrasts with the mildly bimodal distribution seen in the data. Finally, the absence of selection e¤ects is also seen in the hazard function, which retains a mild downward slope for the nested logit model but is nonetheless quite close to a ‡at Calvo hazard. In other words, the spike of immediate readjustments observed in the baseline model, which results from quick correction of large errors, depends on the presence of a strong selection e¤ect.
Conclusions
TO BE COMPLETED 
